[BNP/E3, 13A – Capa-20]
Nº I.1.
Charles Robert Anon
___
[1r]
“The World as Power.”
I. Life is Power.
Struggle for Life.
I. The Individual.
II. The State.
Heraclitus
Being is nought; becoming is all.
But then Being is Becoming. No for then Becoming is Being, and thereby nothing is solved. But if a thing really become|s| other than it is [appearance], it must have anteriorly the power to become. |Existence| is therefore not Becoming, Being [Existence] is Power.
The Process of Nature:
- Power; 2. Movement; 3. Evolution; 4. Struggle for Life. 5. Selection.
[2r]
Books
On Science and on Philosophy.
✓ Darwin: “On the Origin of Species.”
✓ Darwin: “The Descent of Man.”
Ferrière: “Le Darwinisme.”
De Quatrefages: “Darwin et ses Précurseurs Français.”
✓ Binet (A.): “L’Âme et le Corps.”
✓ Le Bon (Gustave): “L’Évolution de la Matière.”
✓ Clodd (Edward): “The Story of Creation.”
✓ Haeckel (Ernst): “The Riddle of the Universe”
✓ Haeckel (Ernst): “The Wonders of Life.”
✓ Clodd: “The Pioneers of Evolution.”
✓ Dunbar (James): “The Process of Creation discovered.”
Hardwicke (W. W., MD): “The Evolution of Man.”
✓ Wurtz: “La Théorie Atomique.”
✓ Balfour Stewart: “The Conservation of Energy.”
✓ Le Dantec: “Les Lois Naturelles.”[1]
[3r]
✓ Hartmann: “Le Darwinisme.”
✓ Ferri (E): “Les Criminels dans l’Art et la Littérature.”
✓ Féré (Ch): “Dégénérescence et Criminalité.”
✓ Ribot (Th): “Maladies de la Mémoire.”
✓ Ribot (Th): “Maladies de la Volonté.”
✓ Ribot (Th): “Maladies de la Personnalité.”
✓ Préaubert: “La Vie, Mode de Mouvement.”
✓ Mabilleau (L): “Histoire de la Philosophie Atomistique.”
✓ Ferrière (E): “La Matière et L’Energie.”
✓ Bourdeau (L): “Histoire de l’Alimentation.”
✓ Haeckel (Ernst): “The Evolution of Man.”
✓ Charlton Bastian: “Brain, the Organ of Mind.”
✓ Ferrière: “L’Âme est la Fonction du Cerveau.” 2 vol.
✓ Janet (Paul): “Les Causes Finales.”
✓ Guyau: “Éducation et Hérédité.”
✓ Romanes: “Animal Intelligence.”
✓ Stallo (J. B.): “The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics.”
✓ Bernstein: “The Five Senses of Man.”[2]
[4r]
✓ Weissman (August): “On Germinal Selection.”
✓ von Naegeli (Carl): “A Mechanico-Physiological Theory of Organic Evolution.”
✓ Spencer: “Principles of Biology.”
✓ Huxley: “Man’s Place in Nature.”
✓ Huxley: “Possibilities and Impossibilities.”
✓ Wilson (Archdeacon): “Problems of Religion and Science.”
✓ Bergson: “Matière et Mémoire.”
✓ Baldwin (J. M.): “Mental Development in the Child and the Race.”
✓ Baldwin (J. M.): “Development and Evolution.”
✓ Féré (Ch.): “Sensation et Mouvement.”
✓ Le Dantec: “Lamarckiens et Darwiniens.”
✓ Lombroso: “L’Homme Criminel.”
✓ Lombroso: “L’Homme de Génie.”
✓ Lombroso et Ferrero: “La Femme Criminelle et la Prostituée.”
✓ Lombroso et Laschi: “Le Crime Politique et les Révolutions.”
✓ Höffding: “Esquisse d’une Psychologie fondée sur l’Expérience.”
✓ Lalande (A): “La Dissolution opposée à l’Évolution.”[3]
[5r]
✓ Palante (G.) : “Combat pour l’Individu.”
✓ Nordau (Max): “Dégénérescence.” 2 vol.
✓ Tarde (G.): “Les Lois de l’Imitation.”
✓ Sollier: “Le Mécanisme des Émotions.”
✓ Ribot (Th): “L’Hérédité Psychologique.”
✓ Ribot (Th): “Psychologie des Sentiments.”
✓ Ribot (Th): “Essai sur l’Imagination Créatrice.”
✓ Proal: “La Criminalité Politique.”
✓ Naville (E.): “La Physique Moderne.”
✓ Garofalo: “La Criminologie.”
✓ Whitney (W. D.): “Life and Growth of Language.”
✓ Draper (J. W.): “History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science.”
✓ Buchner: “Mind in Animals.”
✓ Sutro (E.): “The Basic Law of Vocal Utterance.” (“A recital of a great discovery.”)
✓ Sutro (E.): “Duality of Voice and Speech.”
✓ Sutro (E.): “Duality of Thought and Language.”
✓ Glazebrook: “Laws and Properties of Matter.”
[6r]
✓ Tisserand: “Traité de Mécanique Céleste.”
✓ Poincaré: “Les Nouvelles Méthodes de la Mécanique Céleste.”
✓ Delage (Yves): “Les Problèmes de l’Évolution.”
✓ Le Dantec (F): “La Lutte Universelle. ”
Kropatkine: {…}
[7r]
Fouillée: “Philosophie de Platon.” 2 vol.
Spinoza: “Ethica.”
Funck-Brentano: “Les Sophistes Grecs.”
Leibnitz: “Théodicée.”
Leibnitz: “Monadologie.”
Kant: “Critique de la Raison Pure.”
Schopenhauer: “Le Monde comme Volonté et Représentation.”
Hegel: “Logique.” (Trad. Véra). 2 vols.
Schopenhauer: “The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.”
Schopenhauer: “On the Will in Nature.”
Thomas Aquinas: “Summa Theologica.”
Hegel: “Philosophie de la Nature.”
Hegel: “Philosophie de l’Esprit.”
✓ Aristotle: “Metaphysica.”
Hartmann: “La Philosophie de l’Inconscient.” (2 vols)
✓ Aristotle: “Physica.”
Naville: “Le Libre Arbitre.”
Hamon: “Determinismo e Responsabilidade.”[4]
[8r]
Schopenhauer: “Essai sur le Libre Arbitre.”
Fouillée: “Liberté et Déterminisme.”
Guyau: “Esquisse d’une morale sans Obligation ni Sanction.”
Renouvier: “Histoire et Solution des Problèmes Métaphysiques”
Conant (L. L.): “The Number Concept, its Origin and Development.”
Anonymous: “Supernatural Religion.”
Paine (Thomas): “Age of Reason.”
Paine (Thomas): “The Rights of Man.”
Massey (Gerald): “Ten Freethought Lectures.”
Arnold (Mathew): “Literature and Dogma.”
Arnold (Mathew): “God and the Bible.”
Greg (W. R.): “Creed of Christendom.”
Robertson (J. M.): “Letters on Reasoning.”
Hooper (Charles E.): “Anatomy of Knowledge.”
✓ Laing (S): “Problems of the Future.”
Reade (Winwood): “The Martyrdom of Man.”
Fouillée: “L’Évolutionnisme des Idées-Forces.”
Fouillée: “La Psychologie des Idées-Forces.”[5]
[9r]
✓ Drummond (Henry): “Natural Law in the Spiritual World.”
✓ Lewes: “Science and Speculation.”
Child (Thomas): “Root-Principles in Rational and Spiritual Things.”
✓ Le Dantec: “Les Influences Ancestrales.”
Dastre: “La Vie et La Mort.”
Boinet (Dr. E.): “Les Doctrines Médicales. Leur Evolution.”
Corra (Émile): “La Philosophie Positive.”
Renard: “L’Homme est-il libre?”
Paulhan: “La physiologie de l’esprit.”
{…}: “Essais de Théodicée.”
✓ Leibnitz: “Nouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement Humain.”
✓ Leibnitz: “Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce. ”
✓ Leibnitz: “Lettres.”
✓ Leibnitz: “Systema Theologicum.”
✓ Fénelon: “Traité sur l’Existence de Dieu et de ses attributs.”
Fénelon: “Lettres sur divers sujets de Métaphysique et de Religion.”
Malebranche: “Recherche de la Vérité.”
Malebranche: “Entretiens sur la Métaphysique.”
[15r]
Newton: “Principia.”
Pascal: “Pensées.”
Berkeley: “New Theory of Vision.”
Condillac: “Traité des Sensations.”
✓ Locke: “On the Human Understanding.”
✓ Locke: “Essay on Civil Government.”
✓ Locke: “Letters on Tolerance.”
✓ Descartes: “Discours sur la Méthode.”
Paulhan: “Psychologie de l’Invention.”
Paulhan: “Analystes et Esprits Synthétiques.”
Tanon (L): “Évolution du Droit et de la Conscience Sociale.”
Tissié: “Les Rêves.”
Foucault: “La Psychophysique.”
Hartenberg: “Les Timides et la Timidité.”
Séailles: “Le Génie dans l’Art.”
Ballet (G.): “Le Langage Intérieur.”
Beaussire: “Antécédents de l’hégélianisme dans la philosophie française.”
Blatchford: “God and my Neighbour.”
[15ar]
✓Balmès: “Philosophie Fondamentale.”
[6ar]
What is the substratum of the various qualities and properties which we call matter?
It is, obviously, something unknown.
The substratum of all is plurality.
Everything is a Number.
But plurality, number, though it is[6] a substratum, can it be, is it, the only reality? Obviously not. For this reason, that if plurality being[7] the reality, reality is[8] plural; and reality can be but one. For the notions of plurality and appearance are bound up with closeness.
[6av]
Let us take now the hypothesis of the object being entirely different from our conception and from our sensation of it. Then, since the nervous system is our means of knowing an object, and since this nervous system is itself an object, for it is something to be known, “du connaissable,” as M. Binet says.[9] It is clear then that if the external object be an illusion, the nervous system is also an illusion, since it is of the same order, since it is something also extended, having a certain form, [a certain colour], a certain weight; since these things are so, it is evident that to offer the nervous system as explanation (condition) of sensation is to explain an illusion by another illusion, which is to give no explanation at all. We are carried entirely into the region of |the| noumena and the only thing left us is sensation — sensation qua feeling not sensation qua thing felt, consciousness, not the object thereof. And in this conclusion we may be nearer to truth; yet we are moving away from the object of our discussion, which is not true reality, but the idea of cause in this world, where this be reality or be appearance.
[5ar]
- Cause is anterior and external to effect
- Whence, Cause and Effect must be in, and cannot be out of, Space and Time.
- Cause and Effect are of the same nature. (Being things in space and in time).
- {…}
“On the Idea of Cause”
Les amateurs de l’inutile
“La pénultième est morte.”
[5av]
Cause and effect are two phenomena so connected that we cannot define one completely without defining the other. In this they differ from 2 any successive phenomena such as night and day.
Argument. Why do we not consider night and day as effect and cause?
Note the confusion often made between Cause and Conditions. The ground a house stands on is one of the conditions of that house. It is not its Cause. Similarly the mortar, the bricks, the wood. None of these are causes; yet all are needed — without them the house were not. Hence the defect of scholastic definition of cause: (id) quo ablato tollitur effectus.
“For instance the night succeeds the day and the day the night but we call not the day cause of the night, nor the night cause of the day.”
Alexander Search
[4ar]
Cause = originating power. Seems true and the reason why we say not the day causes the night and the night the day. Or is it because they occupy the same space, one after other? Because they do not represent a movement but a substitution?
Cause is a succession in movement? For instance a man, in football, kicking a ball. The cause of the movement of the ball is the energy in the muscles of the man; the cause of this is the message (also a movement) sent from the brain; and this communication is the effect of the vibration of the optic nerve[10] consequent on the observation of how the ball was moving.
Is there here any idea of Cause, any real idea, be it understood? Or is this but a species of motion?
[4av]
If an “external” reality be the Cause of our sensation, then, according to the 3rd law of cause, it must be of the same nature as the effect. Then since we know all by sensation, sensation is reality. For, otherwise, the Cause would reproduce itself in our brain and we should perceive nothing greater than that.
Reply: we perceive a movement, which, no matter size[11], is always a movement.
[3ar]
What reason have I for thinking that the substratum is different from the properties? Why, this: that were it in any way like a property, or like the properties it were itself a property and no substratum. By the fact that it is a substratum, its nature is different from that of the properties. A substratum must be conceived of necessity as one, as simple, in a word, as immaterial.
Each thing partakes of the properties of matter, consequently of its substratum, spirit. But how? since substratum is one and simple?
Let us examine and consider what property the substratum has, which the individuals have not, generally speaking. Is there one? There is one and this is plurality, number.
But is it right to call number a property?
[16r]
Can the question be stated thus: The external object is the cause of the movement in the muscles[12] of the optic nerve; this latter movement the cause of the perception, in the brain; this perception the cause of the will to kick the ball; this the cause of a nerve-message to the muscles; this nerve-message the cause of the kick; and the kick the cause of the ball’s movement? Is the question, as thus stated above criticism? Are all these which I have named “causes”, causes of the same kind — nay, rather, are they causes in the true sense of the word cause?
Before such a problem, our first feeling is one of confusion. How can an object be cause of a movement of molecules? how can a movement of molecules be the cause of a perception? how can a perception be cause of a will to do something? for all these there is doubt. But we can conceive without trouble that a will is the cause of a nerve-message to the muscles, and that the muscles are the cause of the kick, and
[2av]
the kick the cause of the moving of the ball from one place to another. In all these, somehow, there is faith.
Supposing we are not concerned with a match, but only with idle playing, and I, who am standing by, am equally free to kick the ball, but do not, because I cannot play at all. Comparing this case with the case above we notice this, that in us both — in myself and in the man who can play — the molecular movement of the optic nerve, the perception in the brain are the same. But then, since our actions are different, the Causes of them are not in this perception, which is the same in the player and in myself. The perception then is not a cause; yet without it there were no Cause at all. Neither is it, properly speaking, a condition. It is better and more according to reason to call it, let us say, an excitation.
Before we pass on to the consideration of the true cause in this matter, let us linger
[2ar]
for a moment on this excitation and inquire what the connection between the external object, the molecular movement of the optic nerve and the perception. Is there here a Cause sui generis, a cause different from the one we consider? or is there here a mere mechanical sequence? We shall devote a paragraph or two to the examination of this problem.
It is necessary, in the first place, to declare that this side-question, however slight in appearance, has nevertheless a great importance; it is, be it noticed, bound up with the wide psychological, and ultimately metaphysical problem, of the relations and of the nature of the physical and of the spiritual[13]. It contains one of the great problems of philosophy.
Entering then upon the problem, how, in the first place, can an external object produce a movement along the optic nerve? Still more with elements, what is an external object and what is a nervous system? Mystery as to the object; as to the nervous system, mystery likewise. We know things only by our
[3av]
sensations, by the agency, by the medium of our nervous system; but this nervous system, which is a thing dissected, observed, seen, is likewise and itself a sensation. Mystery is again with us. .....
The “external object” is our sensations of it and the universe is the sum of our sensations, (the) past, (the) present and (the) possible. For if the “external object” be not our sensation of it, then it is either more (superior), or it is less (inferior) or of another kind. If more we perceive a phainoumenon, and we ask no more; let our science be but a science of phenomena, it is still a science, and ours. If less, we know idealisations, and are happy to do so; again, let our science be a science of more than noumena, it is our science and a science still (yet). # “But,” the reader may add,[14] “the contention is that our sensation is a precise reproduction, copy of the object. It is not, I maintain, the object itself.” But this, we object, is false, and creator of a heap of difficulties.
[16v]
Et j’ai rêvé le bien et je me sens pleurer.
_______
{…} douceur
La dedans tout l’horreur d’une chose réelle.
_______
de vous du mal{…}
{…} apôtres
tout le bien est dans le bien des autres.
_______
Pour le sincère croyant père ou prêtre
La chose la plus belle
{…} ce doit être
{…} la bénédiction.
et plus je hais la vie
et plus j’aime les hommes
[17r]
Evil is the sentiment of the world’s, of our, imperfection. Mark this expression well, evil is the sentiment of a not-perfection. But the sentiment of a not-perfection contains the idea of a perfection. The sentiment of a failure from good contains the idea of good. Thus is answered the assertion, which may be made, that the idea we have is of evil, not of good; since in Nature there is hardly anything worthy of the name of good.
Then, by this, is not our theory contradicted of the suffering in all things even in the atomic mind? Not in any way. If good be a human, a latterly developed idea, how then can atoms feel evil? Answer They do not feel evil as we do, because they have not the idea of good. Yet, as far as lies in them,
[17v]
they feel it.
If idea be positive, and equal to, the same as thing, then things are only good and evil when we perceive them to be so, or, more correctly, when they perceive themselves to be so. But, as I have said, since the idea is positive, before the idea came there was zero thereof, no perception of it. Therefore there was entire evil.
But one thing is evil, properly speaking, and another is suffering. Evil, I hold, is of late appearance in things of evolution; suffering is earliest — it is the objective of sensation which is, as I have declared, one of the primal three possibles forming Power and being and living as the world, as Act.
[18r]
The actual world is no manifestation. For the world is a gradual evolution, ex nihilo, of a number of attributes which is infinite.
If these attributes instead of taking infinite time to appear, because at once, out of time, the world were a manifestation.
_______
The expression “occupies infinite space,” or “infinite time” is vicious, inasmuch as to occupy (if it so can be said) infinite space and infinite time is to be infinite space and infinite time. Hence all the falseness of “matérialisme naïf.”
_______
A beginning is anterior to time, as suffering is anterior to the idea of good, consequently of evil.
[18v]
Let us take up again the illustration we[15] employed — that of the man in the football field. — We have said that the movement of the ball somewhere has by the perception of it, transmitted along the optic nerve to the man’s brain, produced a message of that brain to the nerves, to the muscles, resulting finally, for our case, in a kick imparting motion to the football. By the examination of this particular case we hope to be able to find and to define the idea of cause. The first thing that is evident here — immediately evident — is that there is motion throughout. But, upon closer consideration, we find that though there seems to be a movement changing its medium, yet this movement has in it something peculiar and worthy of consideration. Now there is a wrong part in our illustration: in making the ball moving it may seem to indicate that the perception depends on the motion of the external object. Of course it does not; the ball may be at rest and the perception of it move the man to kick it. In this particular case we are therefore bound to begin with the molecular movement along the optic nerve which produces in the brain the perception of the object.
[19r]
Every grown man a metaphysician. We must ask then: how is Metaphysics possible as[16] natural disposition?
As we have met with many contradictions in Metaphysics up to the present time, we ought to be able to determine a certitude either of knowledge or of ignorance, i.e. know if Metaphysics is possible. Last question then: How is Metaphysics possible à titre de Science?
Critique of Reason leads to science. Dogmatism leads to unfounded assertions and after to scepticism.
In old systems contradiction of reason with itself.
I call transcendental all knowledge bearing not generally on objects but on one way of knowing them, as far as that is possible a priori.
_______________________________________________
Anthony Anthony Anthony Anthony Anthony Anthony Anthony Anthony Anthony
[19v]
After reducing the principles of mathematics, some of physics and those supposed in metaphysics to Synthetic a priori judgments, Kant proceeds to state the problem (general and veritable) of pure reason thus:
How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?
___
Judgments of experience all synthetic. How are judgments a priori so?
___
How are pure mathematics possible?
How is pure physics possible?
For since they exist, it is simple to as how; by their very reality it is proved that they are possible.
___
Metaphysics is real, if not as science, at least as natural disposition — (metaphysica naturalis).
___
[20v]
Metaphysics of Power.
- Parmenides and Heraclitus. Power to become.
- Power and act. Identity of power and of act, in Power-in-itself.
- Relation of Power to Act, in the Individual, in pluralized Nature.
- Self-evolution impossible. Evolution the product of an abiding Sufficient Reason. But Sufficient Reason is the general name of Cause.
5.{…}
Contrast
Nerve-fiber being shaken one way, naturally is after to be shake in another direction.
Contrast is was
Met
Antagonism
Antagonism
[1ar]
Philosophy of Aristotle
La philosophie d’Aristote.
_______
La philosophie d’Aristote.
_______
La philosophie d’Aristote
La philosophie d’Aristote
La philosophie d’Aristote
La philosophie
Aristote
La philosophie d’Aristote
|*Gauchavard|
[1] [2v]
I.S.S. = No. 29 = 5s.
Alcan ={…}
Alcan ={…}
Alcan ={…}
Kegan, Paul = International Science Series. No. 41 = 5s.
I.S.S. = No. 42 = 5s.
I.S.S. = No. 21 = 5s.
[2] [3v] R.P.A. — 2½ d.
[3] [4v]
Kegan, Paul: 3s.
Kegan, Paul: 6s.
Kegan, Paul: 6.
Kegan, Paul: 2/6.
[4] [7v]
Alcan 2/50
Alcan 7/50
Alcan 5/00
Alcan
M[c]Millan: (American): 8/6
R.P.A. 3/9
R.P.A. 6d.
R.P.A.
[5] [8v]
Alcan = B.U. = 60c.
Alcan = B.U. = 60c.
[6] it is /be\
[7] being /be\
[8] is /must be\
[9] as M. Binet says. /(to use the expression of M. Binet).\
[10] vibration of the optic nerve /movement of cells along\
[11] size /scope\
[12] muscles /cells\
[13] spiritual /(mental)\
[14] add, /reply\ /explain\ /exclaim\
[15] we /(I)\
[16] as /à titre de\
